It’s been an interesting end of June and early July for Democrats to say the least. The early debate gamble has definitively played out poorly for the Biden campaign, and the entirety of the messaging around the election is now focused squarely on Biden and his age. While it will likely take time before the focus shifts back to Trump (hopefully not too long), we thought it would be interesting to take a look at how the public’s opinion had changed after Trump’s conviction. Moving from the hypothetical to the actual news of the former President being found guilty on all 34 felony counts.
Housing Insecurity in the United States
Over the past few years, the United States has been dealing with an increasingly pressing issue; access to affordable housing. Americans have been facing an exponential increase in rental rates (2.61% per year on average) while home ownership seems too far out of reach for many (average home price has increased by 37.5% [17.5% after accounting for inflation] from February 2020 to February 2023). Housing supply has been declining since 2016, reaching a low of 408,922 active housing listings in January of 2022. This also coincided with an increase in prices, the average price of a home was $408,100 in the fourth quarter of 2021 compared to $327,100 in the fourth quarter of 2019.
As anyone looking for a home knows, the housing market has become extremely competitive due to these changes. According to a recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, only 17.5% of renters say it would be easy to obtain a mortgage right now, this was 20.5% in 2022 and 26% in 2020. Even if you are not actively looking for a home right now, Americans strongly agree that it is a bad time to purchase a home. The housing market being so constrictive has created an increased demand for rental units, leading to high rent increases. Over the past 3 years, rent has increased by 2.61% per year, outpacing wage increases by 169%. Even more depressing, is that if you look back 10 years, average rents have increased 270% more than real wages.
This combination of short housing supply and increasing rents has had detrimental impacts for many Americans. Homelessness has seen an increase of 6% since 2017, increasing to 582,462 homeless Americans in 2022. The levels of homelessness are even more stark when you look at the numbers by race or ethnicity. Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders have the highest rates at 121 per every 10,000 people while the rate for white Americans is only 11.
Regardless of where they live, Americans overwhelmingly see housing as an issue with 85% believing affordable housing is a problem and almost half (49%) saying it is a major problem, a 10-point increase from 2018. However, even though Americans recognize this as an issue, their openness to a solution may pose complications when the government looks to implement affordable housing programs and strategies. It has become quite common to see stories about neighborhoods or towns supporting the idea of solving the housing issue but are less willing when the perception is that their own property values might be affected.
In order to solve this problem, Americans must be able to empathize with those facing these issues and remove themselves from an individualistic view of governmental policy. Last month we conducted a national survey to determine how Americans view this issue and their openness to some possible solutions.
Landscape:
According to our research, a majority of Americans report that they live in a standalone single-family home while another quarter live in an apartment building. This is in line with data from the American Community Survey for which shows 67 percent of homes being single-family and 27 percent being multifamily. As is the case with many things these days, race and ethnicity is a big factor in the type of housing people live in.
Just one-fifth of white respondents live in apartments compared to a third of Hispanic Americans and almost two-fifths of African Americans. Women also report living in apartments at higher rates than men, with 8 percent more women living in apartments, on average, compared to men.
Looking at the ownership status of Americans, a little over half of respondents owned their place of residence while renters made up a little less than half. This divide is slightly different than the national rates which are outlined by Property Management in 2022 as 35% of Americans being renters and 65% being owners.
When breaking down the results, renting is much more common among Hispanic, Black, and female respondents. With three-fifths of Hispanic and Black respondents renting compared to less than two-fifths of their white counterparts. In terms of gender, the divide is smaller, with about half of women renting while men rent at thirty-six percent, a 15-point difference.
Furthermore, housing expenses have been a burden to many Americans and an increasingly large portions of individuals’ incomes have been going toward housing in recent years. According to Consumer Reports, the optimal amount to spend on housing is a fourth of an individual’s income. However, the average is 32 percent for married couples, increasing to thirty-six for single Americans.
Respondents to this survey, on average, reported spending 38.5 percent of their income on housing expenses. However, over half, 57 percent, said they spend more than the 30 percent threshold outlined by Consumer Reports. One interesting finding is that the largest group of respondents, 16 percent, do not spend any money on their housing.
When breaking this down by demographics, there is a similar divide as seen previously. Hispanic and Black Americans spend, on average, almost 15 percent more of their incomes on housing expenses. Women similarly spend over 10 percent more of their income, on average, on housing than men. All three groups, Hispanic, Black, and women, spend more than the average. With Black Americans spending the highest amount, almost 10 percent more than the average and almost double the suggested 25 percent given by the Consumer Report.
While the issue of homelessness and housing insecurity has seen rising prominence in political discussions, the issue, like many other economic issues, has not reached significant recognition by everyday Americans. A significant number of individuals say they have heard about this issue recently, three-fifths saying they have at least heard a good amount. Only 15 percent say they are not educated or aware about this topic at all.
The breakdowns hold relatively consistent across demographic groups, with Hispanic Americans hearing slightly more than other racial groups and men hearing about it slightly more than women.
In terms of actually experiencing housing insecurity or homelessness, most people have not felt the impacts personally. Over half of respondents have not and do not know anyone who has experienced housing insecurity or homelessness. Not even one-fifth of respondents faced either of these issues, with another quarter saying they know someone directly impacted by these issues.
The breakdowns are much more divided than when the respondents were asked about exposure to the issue. Hispanic and Black Americans experienced housing insecurity or homelessness at much higher rates than white Americans. Seven percent more Hispanic Americans and eight percent more Black Americans experienced these issues first-hand compared to white respondents. Both groups also know someone personally who experienced these issues at rates seven points higher than white Americans. Women also experienced this more frequently than men, however only four-points higher. When it came to knowing others who experienced these issues the rate for women was eleven-points higher than the rate among men.
There are many different reasons people point to as the cause for these rising rates of housing insecurity and homelessness. While some point to the government as being at fault, others will blame the economic market itself and individuals making poor financial decisions, among other causes.
In terms of housing insecurity, all three groups got fairly similar ratings, with the housing market being rated slightly higher. The split between the reasons were all around a third, Americans gave equal blame to the housing market, bad government policies, and individuals decision-making.
However, the breakdowns show a slightly altered opinion, with Hispanic and white Americans having similar breakdowns but African Americans were more inclined to place responsibility on the housing market, rating it 3 points higher, on average, than the other two. A bigger difference can be seen when looking at gender. Men were much more likely to blame the individual, rating them at 34.81, while women only rated them at 29.78, a 5-point difference.
When looking at homelessness, the split is similar even between the four groups provided. All groups held around 25 points on average, the top group being bad government policy but only 1.61 points ahead of the lowest group, mental health issues.
The breakdowns for the responsibility of homelessness highlight similar differences between the demographic groups as seen with housing insecurity. Hispanic Americans are much more likely to blame bad government policies, 2 points higher than white and Black Americans. While Black Americans are still more likely to blame the housing market, 3 points higher than Hispanic and white Americans. Men also hold more blame for individuals’ decision-making, ranking it 5 points higher, on average, than women. Women put more responsibility on the housing market and government policies than individuals and mental health.
Groups which have more exposure and are more economically disadvantaged such as women, Hispanic Americans, and African Americans are less likely to blame individuals for housing insecurity or homelessness. With white Americans and men owning housing at higher rates, spending less on housing expenses, and being less exposed to these issues, they are more likely to blame individuals for succumbing to these economic hardships.
A variety of solutions to homelessness and housing insecurity have been proposed over recent years but none have taken the forefront of political action. While these proposals are still up in the air, some have garnered more support than others.
The proposal supported most strongly is the idea of increasing federal funding in order to fund affordable housing projects. It garnered support from over seven-tenths of Americans, with less than two-tenths opposing.
This support is stronger among racial minorities and women, with ten percent more Hispanic Americans and nine percent more Black Americans strongly supporting it, on average, than white Americans. Eight percent more women strongly support it compared to men. White Americans and men also strongly oppose at rates two times higher than other groups.
Similarly, Americans supported increasing state funding for affordable housing projects at high levels. Showing support for both federal and state governments assistance in resolving the housing crisis.
The breakdowns also looked similar, with twelve percent more Hispanic and Black Americans strongly supporting this proposal than white Americans. Additionally, women supported this proposal at a rate nine-points higher than men.
Also strongly supported is the proposal for more low-income housing projects. Having the same amount of support as the previous two proposals, seventh tenths of Americans would like to see more low-income building projects being pursued by the government.
Hispanic Americans are especially in favor of this proposal as 46 percent strongly support it, outpacing African Americans by eight points and white Americans by fifteen points. Women also stood out as two-fifths strongly support this proposal, compared to 28 percent of men.
A proposal with not as much support, but still holding three-fifths of respondents, is the proposal to increase taxes on high income earners.
Support is relatively even across demographic groups, with only two percent more African Americans supporting this proposal compared to white Americans. Men support this proposal more strongly than women, supporting by three-points more on average. Hispanic Americans once again stick out as they strongly support this proposal the highest on average, six-points more than white Americans and three-points more than African Americans. Interestingly, men strongly opposed this idea more than women despite strongly supporting it more too. Women held more mild views on this topic while men felt more strongly divided.
Increasing building density is supported by over half of Americans, however, it is not supported as strongly as the aforementioned proposals.
This fell into a similar pattern as seen in the federal and state funding proposals, with Hispanic and Black Americans supporting at a much higher rate than white respondents. Women also held more support than men again, however, only by four points. Strong opposition was again double for white Americans and men compared to other groups.
The only proposal not to receive support from over half of Americans is the proposal to increase everyone’s taxes in order to fund government programs. Receiving only 36 percent of Americans’ support, this is a very unpopular program, especially compared to taxes on only the wealthy which was discussed previously.
This proposal had more even support among demographic groups, being fairly unpopular among all cohorts. However, white Americans and men had much stronger opposition. Men strongly opposed at rates nine percentage points more than women, and white Americans strongly opposed eleven percentage points more on average than Hispanic Americans and double when compared to Black Americans.
The divides between these racial and gender groups hold true throughout most proposals. With men and white Americans being much less open to policies which would seek to solve the housing crisis. As discussed earlier, men and white Americans are more likely to own their homes, live in single-family homes, and less likely to experience homelessness or housing insecurity. Their lower exposure to the issue means their support is much weaker as they do not see these issues holding personal impact in their lives. They would not want the government to commit resources to programs which do not directly benefit them.
While Americans may be open to these solutions to a certain extent, this support often wanes when the policies provided do not positively affect their lives. For example, when discussing a federal minimum wage increase to 15 dollars an hour, support falls around 55 percent according to YouGov. This support drops as household income increases, from 58 percent for households making under 50,000 dollars a year to 47 percent for households making over 100,000 dollars a year. This eleven-point drop is likely due to the minimum wage increase not directly helping wealthier households, they do not see the value in supporting a policy which does not give them personal gain.
However, building density and low-income housing both continued to see high levels of support even with the added personal element. Building density would have a visual and social impact, especially in rural or suburban areas where it is more sparsely populated. Even with these potential negative impacts, these proposals still saw over four-fifths of respondents holding their support for these proposals. There were around 15 percent of respondents for each proposal who lost support when we added that it would occur in their neighborhood, showing there is slight opposition to solutions which impact one’s life personally. This may be due to Americans not viewing these as negative additions to their neighborhoods, not aware of the potential impacts to housing markets, or public resources these policies would have.
The breakdowns for these specific proposals show similar trends as seen with the more general proposals asked previously. With Hispanic and Black Americans holding more support, and Hispanic respondents specifically supporting low-income housing very strongly. As well, female respondents continue to support these at higher rates than male respondents.
White Americans and men are more easily dissuaded from supporting these policy proposals when the solutions are targeted at their neighborhoods. Considering these groups are more likely to live in single-family homes and pay less in housing expenses, they live in wealthier areas on average compared to the other demographic groups. According to the Brookings Institute, people of color made up 64% of the population in the top 50 U.S. cities during 2018 but only 41% of the suburbs around these cities. The Census also states that Black and Hispanic Americans face poverty at rates of 18.8% and 15.7% respectively in 2019, compared to 7.3% of White Americans. Similarly, the Census states how women faced poverty at rates of 12.9% in 2018 while the rate for men was only 10.6%. This means they hold stronger opposition as high density and low-income housing could affect the social and economic status of their neighborhoods negatively. Hispanic, African Americans, and women are more likely to show support as they live in areas where these projects would be beneficial such as urban centers and low-income neighborhoods. Also, they experience housing insecurity at higher rates, meaning they are more open to solutions as they can se the benefits first-hand.
Finally, many see housing as an essential good, similar to food, and believe the government should be taking a role assisting in providing this good to the public. However, some reject this idea and are wary of any kind of government intervention into the housing market.
The government takes much different approaches to renting compared to housing support. A significant number of respondents said the government should be taking a role in helping Americans both rent and own, with 44 percent preferring this. Renting had slightly less support than owning, seventeen compared to 21 percent. However, a large majority support some form of assistance, with only 10 percent saying the government should not be involved at all.
White Americans and men are both resistant to government intervention, with 14 percent of each saying neither. This rate is only 6 percent for Hispanic Americans, 2 percent for African Americans, and 7 percent for women. African Americans are most likely to support rent assistance, while white Americans and men both support owning at the highest levels. When referring to the levels of those who rent versus own, this trend correlates as Hispanic, Black Americans, and women all rent at higher levels. Americans are most likely to support policies which will aid them, since white Americans and men do not rent as often as other groups, they support rent assistance at the lowest rates.
Looking specifically at policies involving government intervention, there is lower support, on average, than the previously discussed policies. The one outlier of this a program where the government would cover the last months rent and security deposit in the form of a loan for low-income renters. Almost fourth-fifths of respondents support this policy, more than all those previously discussed.
The lowest supported were a program where the government would provide checks to individuals for any expenses, they deem necessary and the proposal where the government would subsidize building projects, but they would be owned and operated by private companies. Holding 52 and 57 percent support respectively. The support waning for these shows the lack of trust for both individuals and the housing market. As seen previously, people blame the government, housing market, and individuals equally so Americans do not trust any enough to give them free reign. They do not want Americans to get stimulus from the government for anything they deem necessary as they do not believe it would be utilized for essential goods like housing. They do not support private companies owning the properties as strongly as they hold mistrust in the housing markets attitude toward Americans.
When this data is broken down, Hispanic Americans support all these policies at higher rates than other races. The largest difference was with the proposal to subsidize single-family housing projects which would be sold by the government, where Hispanic Americans strongly support it at 44 percent while for white Americans it is only 22 percent, a fifteen-point difference. Women also support all these policies at higher rates, the largest difference being for the proposal to provide individuals with stimulus checks specifically for housing. 35 percent of women strongly support this proposal while only 23 percent of men do, a twelve-point difference.
As previously observed, men and white Americans are less prone to supporting government intervention policies as they do not recognize a need for it. As they own at higher rates and experience housing insecurity at lower rates, they would not support the government funding these kinds of projects as they are not personally affected by the issues these policies are aiming to solve.
Furthermore, there is much contention when discussing who should qualify for this form of governmental support. Americans hold a range of views, some favoring more restrictions on government intervention while some favor more open welfare programs. Out of the categories provided, the elderly were the most supported with almost two-thirds supporting housing assistance. Five other groups are supported by a majority of respondents with only three not gaining over half support. Part-time workers, students with financial need, and recently employed individuals were the least supported with students and recently unemployed individuals not even receiving two-fifths support.
This breakdown continues the trends observed previously, with Hispanic, African Americans, and women being more supportive of government support. The four most drastic differences were with low-income, dual-parent households, part-time workers, students, and recently unemployed individuals. Women support all these groups at rates ten-points more or higher than men. Racial demographics had fewer stark differences compared to gender divides, with the largest difference being with students where Hispanic Americans support providing them with housing assistance 9-points higher than white Americans.
Americans may recognize the rising rates of housing insecurity and homelessness as a pressing issue; however, this acknowledgement does not necessarily correlate with support. While support for a solution may seem strong, it is weaker than it appears when looking at specific groups. Support is strong within communities which are directly impacted by this issue such as racial minorities, women, urban communities, renters, and other economically disadvantaged groups. When it comes to other groups such as men and white Americans, the support wanes, especially when resolutions affect them personally. Policies such as taxes on everyone are much less popular, especially among groups which do not experience housing insecurity and homelessness at high rates. Without the support from groups as large as these, it appears solutions are far from being implemented. Without Americans being exposed personally to these issues and seeing the implications of homelessness and housing insecurity first-hand, support may be difficult to garner.
Next time you are asked your opinion on public policies, consider the people outside your community it may affect. Empathy can prove an essential tool in implementing public policy, showing everyday Americans problems which may not affect them directly are still important.
The Effects of the 2023 SCOTUS Rulings
State of the Supreme Court 2022 to 2023
In June 2022, the Supreme Court made a series of decisions that were received poorly by a large percentage of the American public. The Dobbs v. Jackson decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade, arguably received the largest amount of attention. But also included were the decisions of West Virginia v. the E.P.A (which curbed the powers of the E.P.A. when regulating the energy sector), Carson v. Makin (which legitimized the practice of prayer in public schools), and Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (which established excluding religious schools from public funding as unconstitutional). All of which were passed through by the six conservative justices in the majority.
These decisions pushed public opinion around the Supreme Court in a negative direction and were the impetus for our look into the views that the public held of the Court, and the public’s openness to a set of potential reforms. As discussed, a year ago, the legitimacy of the court, for many Americans, was in question.
A year later, and before rulings on bigger cases are likely to be released, we revisited many of the questions from a year ago to see how views have shifted within the American public.
In July 2022, right after these decisions were made, there was an increase in negative feelings with over half (55%) of views Americans held of the court being negative. This is in comparison to the 44% which were positive in nature. Over the past year, the negative feelings have subsided slightly while the positive feelings increased. In May of this year, the negative perceptions dropped to an average of 46% (a 9-point drop) and the concentration of positive feelings increased roughly seven points to 50.9%.
When we breakdown the scores Americans provided, we can see a change from the strong negative feelings in July of 2022, to more mild negative feelings and stronger positive feelings in May of 2023.
Following the decisions of 2022, most positive feelings were concentrated at lower levels, with 29% viewing the Supreme Court positively. These positive views were split between the 16% who had almost entirely positive views of the Court, and the additional 13% who held mostly positive views. Combined these very positive views were offset by the 31% who had very low positive scores for SCOTUS (31% gave a score of 0-20). This shifted over the past year, with the very low positive feelings dropping 11 points, to 20%, while strong and very strong positive feelings grew from 29% to 35% (a 6-point increase).
We can see this reflected in the spread of negative feelings as well. In July 2022, there was a concentration of 28% who held very strong negative feelings. This dropped by 9 points to 19% over the past year. That being said, the overall concentration of those holding negative feelings the majority of the time (61 or above on the 0-100 scale), dropped just 3 points from 38% to 35%.
Last year, detractors of the Court pointed to their rulings as not being grounded in the Constitution. Given this line of argument being so prevalent, we asked Americans what they felt the Court’s motivations were.
When first asked in July of last year, there was an even split between Americans who believed the rulings were based on the Constitution and those who believed they were based on other considerations. Only 50.4% of Americans believed these decisions were made based on the Constitution. This lack of faith has changed slightly over the past year. In May of 2023, those who believe the decisions were being made on other considerations decreased from 49.4% to 45.8%, and the sentiment that the rulings are based on the Constitution increased from 50.4% to 51.9%.
While the averages moved slightly, when we look at the breakdown of the scores, the changes become clearer. Looking at the breakdown of the idea that the decisions were based on the Constitution, we can see a similar range in 2023 as we saw in 2022, with a 4-point increase in strong believers and a 2-point increase in weak believers. Overall, the public’s faith in the Supreme Court has improved slightly as the average has leaned stronger for those who believe they base the decisions on the Constitution.
However, the changes become starker when looking at the breakdown of those who believe the decisions are based on other considerations and not the Constitution. In 2022, the view that the Supreme Court was not making decisions based on the Constitution was closely dived by those who felt this strongly (30%), those who do not feel this as strongly, or at all, (36%), and those in the middle (34%). Those who feel this strongly dropped three points, those who do not feel this strongly increased by seven points, and those who are in the middle decreased by four points.
Another area of measurement we used to gauge opinions was asking the American public how they felt about the level of power each branch of government held. In July of last year, the public felt that all three branches held too much power, with the judicial branch having the highest perceived view of having too much power (a score of 60.4 where 50.0 means the right amount of power. This was five points higher than the executive branch, and eight points above the legislative branch.
Over the past year, these sentiments have all moved closer to having the right amount of power, especially with the judicial branch. While it continues to be the branch with the highest level of having too much power, in 2023, SCOTUS received an average score of 54.0 (a 6.4-point drop). Over the same time period, the executive branch dropped 3.7 points to 52.2 and the legislative branch stayed almost identical at an average score of 52.2.
Looking at the breakdown of these scores, we can better understand how the increasing faith in the government may not be so transparent.
For the legislative branch there was not much significant change in the average or the breakdown. The concentration of those who feel strongly that the legislative branch has too much power went from 18% to 19%. Those who feel that have too little power changed by three points (42% in 2022, and 39% in 2023), while those who sit in the middle increased by 2 points.
The executive branch saw a similar pattern in the average, but a bigger shift toward those who strongly believe the President holds too much power. Despite the overall decrease in the average score, the concentration of those who believe it holds too much power increased. Indeed, the concentration of strong believers increased from 20% in 2022 to 25% in 2023. This coincided with a 4-point decrease in those feeling the executive branch does not have enough power (from 40% to 36%).
Unlike the other two branches, the judicial branch did not see changes of note in the bigger categories. Those who feel the judiciary has too much power went from 33% to 32%. At the same time those who feel that the judiciary does not have enough power stood at 39% in 2022, and currently is at 36%. While this does not represent no movement, given the drop in the average score, the expectation was that the movement would have been more notable. Instead, there was more movement within groups versus moving from one group to another.
Switching gears slightly, we wanted to see how the public reacted to some of the reform ideas that had been discussed by many sources last year. These included SCOTUS agreeing to a code of ethics, setting an age limit for justices, establishing term limits, and expanding the number of justices on the court.
In 2022, we saw high levels of support for three of the reform proposals while the fourth was supported but not at the same level. The support level for three of the reforms dipped slightly over the year, while one idea gained nearly eight points during the same time period.
The highest testing reform idea in 2022 was establishing a code of ethics which would prevent any justices from participating in cases which held conflicts of interest. Over the past year, support remained similar on average, and also when looking at the breakdown of responses. The concentration of strong supporters went from 47% to 48% while detractors went from 17% to 19%, those in the middle were at 17% at both points.
The idea of an age limit also remained relatively steady on the average and within the breakdown of responses. Strong supporters went from 47% in 2022 to 48% last month, and the detractors went from 20% to 21%.
The idea of expanding the Court to 13 justices tends to get the most airtime given the potential outcome of such action. However the idea has been ruled out by the White House and would require jettisoning the filibuster in the Senate, which seems unlikely at best, and certainly not going to happen in the current Senate for this particular issue.
That being said, more people support the idea than oppose it, and the average support dipped less than a point over the past year. The breakdown yet again shows a very low level of movement with strong support going from 36% to 34%, and strong opposition from 27% to 28%.
The one reform idea we tested that did show movement is setting term limits. In 2022, the average support was 61.8 and then increased to 69.1 by May of 2023. The breakdown of responses also showed some interesting movements. Given the increase in the average we would have thought that the strong supporters would have increased, but instead we saw a slight dip in strong support (42% in 2022 to 39%). We did see an increase of 3 points among those in the middle range.
While there was not much movement between the groups at the high end of support, we did see that many strong supporters increased their already high level of support over the past ten or so months.
As we have observed, public opinion has been improving over the past year surrounding the functioning of the Supreme Court. But this had very little impact on the potential reforms to the Court. With some big cases being announced over the next month or so, it will be interesting to see where the views of Americans head. At the same time, it seems clear that the Court is still on very thin ice when it comes to public perception, and it is unlikely that the desire for reform is likely to go away anytime soon.
With One Week To Go Before We Hit the Debt Ceiling, Politicians (and the American Public) Agree On Very Little
We are about a week away from a default on the U.S. debt and it’s not only Washington that can’t agree on what to do. The American public also has very different ideas on what should happen. This month, just 22% of Americans feel we should increase the debt ceiling without conditions while 28% want it increased with some cuts. Another one in five Americans (20%) want the debt ceiling increased with major cuts and 12% do not want it increased at all. Nearly 1 in 5 (17%) don’t have a stated opinion.
One thing that there is agreement on it that neither side has made great strides convincing the public that their approach is the best way as there has been little change in Americans’ views since early April.
Unsurprisingly, demographics and political allegiance have a large effect on Americans’ views towards raising the debt ceiling. Indeed, Americans 65 and older are over 9 points more likely to want the debt ceiling increased with no conditions than those under 65. A third of younger Americans want it increased with some cuts and another third do not want it increased at all (three times more than their elders). The largest difference comes from Biden versus Trump voters as two-thirds of Biden voters want the debt ceiling increased with a few or no cuts while just 35% of Trump voters say the same. Trump voters are more than twice as likely as Biden voters to want it increased with major cuts and one in five do not want it increased at all (just 6% of Biden voters don’t want to see it increased). Further breaking down Trump voters, those who are vaccinated against COVID-19 are 19 points more likely to support a clean bill or small cuts compared to those who are not vaccinated. A quarter of non-vaccinated Trump voters do not want the debt ceiling increased at all.
Similar to leaders in Washington, Americans who want to see cuts to spending in order to raise the debt ceiling do not have a clear consensus of where the cuts should come from. On average, Americans think 18% of the cuts should come from military spending and with 15% coming from education. Society Security and Medicare should make up about a quarter of the cuts according to Americans who think there should be cuts with another 11% coming from veterans’ benefits. Overall, Americans think a third of the cuts should come from other places. Trump voters who want cuts think that nearly half should come from “other” places while Biden voters who want cuts want to see them more evenly distributed with 21% coming from military spending. Following a similar pattern, younger Americans want the cuts evenly distributed while older Americans think a majority of the cuts should come from other sources.
Overall, Americans think a third of the cuts should come from other places. Trump voters who want cuts think that nearly half should come from “other” places while Biden voters who want cuts want to see them more evenly distributed with 21% coming from military spending. Following a similar pattern, younger Americans want the cuts evenly distributed while older Americans think a majority of the cuts should come from other sources.
One in ten Americans who want to see cuts do not want any cuts from the military, education, veterans’ benefits, Social Security, or Medicare. Three in ten think the military should receive the biggest cuts while another quarter think education should face the steepest cuts.
Americans who want to see cuts have similar opinions when it comes to how much the military and education should be cut, but when it comes to veterans’ benefits, a majority of Americans who want cuts think veterans’ benefits should be cut by 11-20%, a third don’t think it should be cut at all.
Additionally, a third of Americans who want cuts do not think the cuts should come from Social Security or Medicare, but a majority think there should be 1-20% of cuts from each.
Leaders in Washington still seem to be nowhere near agreement of how to move forward with raising the debt ceiling, but at the very least, no matter what they end up being able to pass, no one is going to be happy about it, especially Republican voters.
The Debt Ceiling: A Possible End to the GOP?
2022 Election: October 17th Update
We’re heading into the final stretch before Election Day, and we’re back with an update on how Americans are thinking about voting.
Last month, we saw that Democrats had an advantage over Republicans in terms of who Americans were planning to vote for and who they ideally wanted in control of the House and Senate. Over the past month, the “race” has tightened as more Americans have solidified behind one of the two parties.
When we look at the breakdown of the scores compared to a month ago, we see that the percent of those who are certain about their vote increased 6 points for Democrats compared to three points for Republicans. However, we see a slight increase in the total percentage of Americans who are definitely, or leaning towards, voting for the Republican candidate (4-point increase).
Diving deeper, we see that the breakdown between men and women has experienced some movement over the course of the month. The number of women 100% certain they’re voting for the Democratic candidate increased by 5 points while the number of men 100% certain they’re voting jumped 6 points. However, now 22% of men are 100% certain they’re voting for the Republican candidate compared to just 15% in September.
In September we saw definitive differences in voting preference among women when we looked at different age groups. Last month women over the age of 65 were much more sure about their vote as well as more supportive overall of Democratic candidates. Four weeks later we find that younger cohorts are now looking more similar to the 65+ crowd. As you can see in the chart below, the number of younger women who are 100% certain they’re voting for the Democratic candidate increased dramatically over the last month, while women 45-64 and 65+ showed more moderate gains.
Over the past month we have also seen Democrats “coming home.” In September we found that most voters were sticking with their 2020 party preference, but 2020 Trump voters were much more confident in their vote. Four weeks later we find that the two voting groups are acting very similarly with a majority of both cohorts now 100% certain in their vote and about a quarter leaning towards voting for the same party this year as they did two years ago. Non 2020-voters also moved strongly towards supporting the Democratic candidate on November 8th.
Looking again at voters as a whole, we see that a plurality of voters want Democrats to retain control over both the House and the Senate. However, this number dropped by 4 points over the last month from 51% to 47%. In contrast, the number of those who would prefer to see Republicans in full control increased by 2 points and the number of those who would like a split House and Senate increased by 3 points.
Among the voters who say they’re unsure of who they’re voting for in the upcoming election (13% of the electorate), the number of those who want Democrats to maintain control of Congress decreased while those wanting Republican control held steady. Currently a plurality are hoping to see a split Congress in 2023.
Regardless of what people want to happen, we have also been asking voters what they think will happen. In September, two in five voters believed that Democrats would keep both the House and Senate, while one in five expected a split Congress, and 17% believed that the GOP would take control of both. Since then, the number of those expecting Democrats to stay in power has experienced a 5-point drop while the number of those expecting Republicans to take charge of both increased by 3 points. Additionally, both those who believe the Democrats will hold onto the Senate while losing the House and those who are unsure how the election will turn out increased by 2 points.
While it is not surprising that voters have become more certain overall about who they’re voting for with the election almost here, when we take a closer look there are several important findings to take into account. There’s been an increase in the number of young women, Biden voters, and those who didn’t vote in 2020 who say they’re 100% certain they’re voting for the Democratic candidate. Despite this, less than half of voters now say they want Democrats to keep control of both the House and the Senate and even fewer predict that will happen. What this all means is a bit of a guessing game but we will know the answers in less than a month from now.
2022 Election: September 27th Update
With about six weeks to go before the November election it is feeling safe to say that this is a year like no other. Through the first five months of this year, it looked more likely than not that the Democrats were going to have a bad night. The debate was between a terrible outcome or a really bad night. Historically there was little hope of an expansion of seats in Congress. Since 1934, the party in charge of the White House has gained seats in just three elections (1934, 1998, and 2002). In each of these instances there was a mitigating circumstance: the Great Depression, the Impeachment of Bill Clinton, and 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan respectively.
Additionally in the past if the perception of the economy was not faring well in public opinion, the party in charge is rarely rewarded with additional seats. At the beginning of 2022 29.8 percent of Americans felt the country was on the right path, a number that held relatively steady through April, according to the Real Clear Politics average. Further data that pointed to a blood bath for the Democrats was the fact that President Joe Biden had been under water when it came to his favorability (the negatives outweigh the positives) since August of 2021.
Historically when the sitting President’s favorability rating is under 50% going into an off-year election his party has gained seats exactly zero times. Similarly when inflation has been above 2% in an election year, the sitting president’s party has never gained seats.
All of this just looked bad for Democrats, but then June rolled in and the Supreme Court overturned Roe v Wade sending a shock to our country as a whole, and changing the trajectory of the upcoming election. Since the ruling, Biden’s net favorability went from -20 to about -10. In late June Republicans had a 4.3-point average in the Real Clear Politics average generic house question nationwide. Since then, Democrats have moved ahead and now hold a one point advantage.
Typically at this point in the election cycle there is a clear narrative developing around what is likely to happen in November. One side has a clear advantage and the wind behind their backs, while the other party starts to circle the wagons and hopes to mitigate the damages. This year, we now have two counter-acting forces that are making the tea leaves murky at best. On the one side you have close to a century of data, high inflation, and an unpopular President. On the other you have the overturn of Roe and those who feel strongly against authoritarian desires of the current GOP.
Six weeks is a lifetime in politics, but as of right now it is anyone’s guess of what will actually happen on November 8th. It could be Republicans taking over the House and Senate. It could be Democrats holding the House and expanding by a seat or two in the Senate (best case scenarios in our estimation), or it could be a split decision with the Democrats expanding their Senate majority and losing the House. Can’t wait for the spin on that outcome.
To try to get a better idea of what is happening in the electorate, we recently asked one of our national panels their thoughts on the upcoming Election and not just what they want to have happen, but what they think will happen.
We took a page out of our friends at Trendency’s book and didn’t just ask who are you voting for, but what are the chances you are going to vote for a candidate of the two major parties. This allows for more nuance, and also a better understanding of what voters are more likely to do in November. As the chart above shows, voters say there’s nearly a six in ten chance they’ll vote for a Democratic candidate, while there’s just a four in ten chance of them voting for a Republican. These are nationwide numbers, but regardless, good news for Democrats.
That being said, averages can sometimes mask what is really going on. Breaking this number down, the chart shows more of an advantage for the generic Democrat. They have a 10-point advantage when it comes to those who are 100% sure whom they will vote for, and a 14-point advantage when it comes to those leaning in one direction. Also worth noting here is that given everything that is going on in the world, there are still 15% of voters who say they are 50/50 on who they will end up voting for.
Unsurprisingly we find that there are distinct differences when it comes to different demographic groups. For example, gender plays a significant role in how voters are planning on voting. While Democrats are preferred among both men and women, women are more likely to be absolutely certain they’re voting for a Democratic candidate by an 11 point margin. At the same time, women are also much more likely than men to say they are 100% voting for the Republican candidate by a seven point margin. A third of men are leaning towards voting for the Democratic candidate. Arguably, this is likely to be the group that decides the outcome of the election. If these men end up going with the Democratic candidate it should be at least an OK night for the party, if they head in the other direction it won’t be good for team Blue.
But before we paint female voters in a broad brushstroke, once we add age into the analysis we see a less universal view.
Women 65+ have basically made up their mind. They are strongly behind the Democratic candidate (a 13-point advantage among those who are 100% certain of their vote), and there are relatively few voters leaning in one direction, and almost no 50/50 voters. As you move down the age categories the picture changes with women under 45 much more split although still with an advantage to the Democratic candidate. These numbers appear to point to a lot of churn but when we look at who these voters voted for in the 2020 Presidential cycle the numbers look fairly stable.
Indeed, while Trump voters are more certain that they will vote for the Republican again this year than Biden voters are certain they’ll stick with the same party (58% positive compared to 42%), there’s an equal number of both Trump and Biden voters who are unsure or who think they’ll vote the opposite way. Further there are only a handful who are certain they are switching parties. Interestingly we see that non-2020 voters are almost twice as likely to say they are definitely voting for the Democratic candidate versus the Republican. Now whether these voters turn out or not is an entirely different question.
To keep things interesting we also asked voters what their ideal outcome is for the election. Again, we see a distinct advantage for the Democrats with a majority hoping that Democrats will retain both chambers of Congress, compared to just 22% who want the GOP to be in control of both. 12% are hoping for a split decision and a similar 15% are unsure of what they want.
In general people who are positive about whom they are voting for want to see that reflected in the eventual control of Congress. However, an interesting number to look at is the percent of those who are unsure of their vote but know who they want in charge. Just about half (49%) want Democrats to keep both (fairly certain which way they will lean), while just 7% want Republicans to gain control. The interesting question is what do the 21% who want a split decision do with their vote? And do the 23% of undecided voters who are unsure of who they want in control still turn out or do they stay at home?
While much of this data points to an advantage for Democrats (usual caveat of nationwide numbers are not a perfect predictor of what is going to happen district by district) there is a little cold water to throw on the left side of the aisle. Voters tend to be very astute when it comes to predicting what is going to happen in their state and in their district. In fact in 2016 voters in our panels correctly predicted the winner in all of the states we were tracking.
When it comes to the 2022 elections, voters in our nationwide panel are less bullish on Democrats’ chances.
As the chart above shows, 2 in 5 think that the Democrats will keep both chambers. 1 in 5 think it will be a split decision, and less than 1 in 5 think the GOP will take over both. Almost 1 in 4 are unsure. Clearly, even your average voter is confused about what their counterbalancing forces predict. That being said, most Americans are expecting their ideal outcome will become reality this November.
Indeed, seven in ten of those who want Democrats to retain both chambers expect it to happen. Three in five of those who want a split Congress believe it will happen, while two-thirds of those who want Republicans to take over both chambers think it will happen.
It’s murky out there, but we will continue to keep an eye on the numbers. One thing is for certain, the chance of a big wave election for the Republicans seems unlikely at this point (as does a blue wave, but not many people were really expecting that outcome).
Are Hispanic Voters Leaving the Democratic Party?
There has been a good amount of chatter on this topic recently from credible and less credible outlets (not surprisingly coming to different views on how big this possible migration will be). Regardless of source bias, there has undoubtedly been a very concerted effort by the Republican Party to make inroads into the Hispanic and Black voting communities in many key states. This is a smart strategic play, and since Democrats seem unable to walk and chew gum at the same time, the party tends to only pay attention to these cohorts in the weeks leading up to Election Day. Republicans certainly don’t need to win a majority of voters of color, but a few points of movement changes the math in many swing states.
Before we get too much deeper into this topic, it is worth mentioning that as is the case with most ethnic groupings, there are vast differences in opinions and behavior among different subsets of these groups. Cuban Americans have different views than Puerto Ricans, or Americans who immigrated from El Salvador (as an example), and different generations tend to hold different views as is the case in just about every ethnic group. The Hispanic population is complex, diverse, and we do a disservice by just talking about any ethnic group as a monolithic voting bloc. That being said, we will be 100% guilty of doing this since our datasets are not large enough to track individual backgrounds and generations within Hispanic respondents. Shame on us, but we work with the data we have.
Rewinding a little, the results of the 2020 election were surprising to many, especially the level of support that former President Donald Trump received from Hispanic voters. The official exit polls had the support for President Joe Biden at 65% among Hispanic voters, and the former president at 32%. In 2016, the exit polls had Hillary Clinton at 65% among Hispanic voters, and Trump at 29%. In 2012, it was a 71%-27% split in favor of President Barack Obama. The growth of support that Trump enjoyed, while not massive, has been somewhat counterintuitive given his rhetoric around immigrants and immigration from Central and South America.
Some have attributed the movement to religious views, but this theory doesn’t hold much water in our opinion since both parties have been fairly consistent in their social issue views over the past decade or so. It is also unlikely, in our opinion, that the legislation being passed by President Biden and the Democratic House and Senate have suddenly turned off Black and Hispanic voters (at least not in a measurable fashion). Our theory is that there is something else happening, especially among specific Hispanic communities….effective disinformation campaigns. And we are not talking about a few negative ads.
Russia has been actively involved in the spread of disinformation for years now. The 2016 election was possibly the first time many of us became aware of it, but regardless of when awareness happened, the practice still is going on. As our friends at Trendency discussed recently, disinformation around COVID can be easily traced back to Russia, as well as disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine. In fact, studies are showing that Russia is responsible for about a third of the fake information around COVID.
When it comes to the invasion of Ukraine, over 650,000 new accounts were created on Twitter from the the start of the war in mid-February through the end of March that focused exclusively on the war. These accounts were responsible for almost five million tweets on the topic during this time period. This is not to put the blame squarely on Twitter; we also know that Facebook is a source of much of the misinformation, albeit the platform makes it harder to pinpoint exact numbers of accounts and what misinformation is being spread.
Moving back in time, the New York Times this past week reported on how Russia was using the Women’s March in 2017 as an opportunity to spread misinformation and create divisions. Most of the narratives around a lack of inclusiveness for women of color, or claims of anti-Semitism in the movement can be traced to a group in St. Petersburg. Last month the Times also reported on the efforts coming out of Russia focused on Spanish speaking audiences. We know it is happening, but how effective are these efforts?
Over the last six months, we have engaged with over 6,000 voters (including about 700 Hispanic voters) on a multitude of topics ranging from issues of the day, to voting preferences. Two of these topics are of special interest to us and our continued tracking of the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns: views on the events in Ukraine and vaccine hesitancy. While not a perfect measure, we use vaccine hesitancy as a measurement of openness to disinformation and we also view the same to be true of the belief that Russia had legitimate reasons to invade Ukraine.
Since March 2021, we have been asking all of our panelists what their vaccination status is. This question has changed slightly over the last year and a half as boosters became a thing, and as we have moved through multiple variants. What we have found is that 7 in 10 Hispanic panelists are fully vaccinated (first two shots of Moderna or Pfizer, or one shot of the OG J&J), but a little over a third of this group has not gone back for a booster.
As the chart above shows, the overall base vaccination rate is in line with white voters, but the uptake on the booster is lagging behind among Hispanics. With the number of those who have not been vaccinated and don’t plan to be, and the lower uptake on the boosters, it is clear that vaccine hesitancy among Hispanic voters is considerable.
Looking at the other issue that has been subject to an abundance of disinformation attacks, we asked voters about the conflict taking place in Ukraine. Overall, 64% of Hispanics say they are paying attention to the situation in Ukraine and, as is the case with all ethnicities, the attention has been lagging over time. That being said, we do see that Hispanics who voted in 2020 are more likely to say they are paying closer attention (again similar to the results across all ethnicities) and we see little difference in partisanship.
The question that is arguably the most important to determine the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns is the level of legitimacy that Americans place on Russia’s invasion. This data has been collected on our Trendency platform where questions are typically asked in an allocation format. So not “do you think the invasion of Ukraine was legitimate or not,” but “how much of the decision was for legitimate reasons and how much of the decision was based on other factors/reasons.”
Overall, we see that Hispanic voters are much more likely to give weight to the idea that Russia has legitimate reasons to invade. Indeed, the average allocation among white Americans is 30.2 while among Hispanic Americans it is more than 10 points higher at 40.8. Looking at the breakdown of the scores also shows the differing views. While 21% of white Americans feel the majority of Russia’s rationale was legitimate, that number is 24% higher among Hispanic Americans (26% overall). On the flip side, 26% of white Americans say that there were no actual legitimate reasons for Russia to invade, while just 15% of Hispanics agree.
Looking at the above data through the lens of vaccination status within Hispanic respondents, we don’t see a major difference when it comes to the legitimacy of Russia’s invasion. However if we look at vaccination status and partisanship we do find some telling differences.
Overall, 59% of Hispanic respondents in our panel report that they voted for Biden in 2020. When we layer in vaccination status we find that 65% of vaccinated Hispanics voted for Biden and just 17% for Trump. Among those who are unvaccinated, just 34% voted for Biden and 33% voted for Trump (27% report not voting). Further, if we then break this down by state, we see an even bigger discrepancy. Among Hispanics in Red States and Blue States we see little difference in our results. Six in 10 (60%) report voting for Biden in Red States and 62% say the same in Blue States. However in Swing States with sizeable Hispanic populations (Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and Texas) that number drops to 53%.
Among vaccinated Hispanics in these state groupings, the numbers bumps up for Biden (65% in Red States, 69% in Blue States, and 58% in Hispanic-heavy Swing States). However, among unvaccinated Hispanics (there is a sample size caution in these numbers), Biden’s support plummets to 25% in Red States, 33% in Blue States, and 34% in the Hispanic-heavy Swing States.
It is always tough to definitively prove misinformation but here is what we know: Russia is targeting Spanish speakers with misinformation around Ukraine. We find that Hispanic Americans are more likely to believe that Russia had legitimate reasons to invade Ukraine.
We also know that vaccine hesitancy is based heavily on misinformation, and Hispanic Americans are vaccinated at a much lower rate than white Americans. Finally, we see that in 2020 support level among Hispanic voters for President Biden has a strong correlation with vaccination status and if they are living in highly targeted states.
The data seems to be pointing not to an issue for the Democrats around losing Hispanic voters, but to a much bigger issue….a large scale disinformation campaigns coming mostly from overseas.
Will the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis Be Its Downfall?
We Are Officially Living in an American Ideological Apartheid System
With all due respect to Lego… Everything is NOT Awesome. In the past week, the Supreme Court has decided that women are lesser humans, who are not in charge of their own decisions. But at the same time, they have decreed that guns are for everyone…everywhere. And that conservative Christendom should be given a higher status than every other belief. There is no actual legal thinking going on here, what we are seeing is the Supreme Court now joining the legislative branch in trying to codify the ability for the minority to control the majority. They claim this is “originalist thinking.” But it is not a legal or judicial approach, it is a political one.
While this has been building for years, we now officially are living in an American ideological Apartheid system. The conservative minority now gets to dictate how all Americans live based on their world views. In an odd twist of historical fate, we have become the country that the Puritan Pilgrims likely would have wanted us to become.
Anger at Republicans is certainly a reasonable reaction, but they have not been exactly working in the shadows when it comes to solidifying the power of the minority over the majority. Republicans have been using the rules of our republic to their advantage since the mid-1960s after Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act. Since then, Democrats have been focusing on policy while the Republicans have focused on power. Our eternal hope that the other side is abiding by the same rules of common decency is a big part of why we are where we are today.
We’ve seen enough. It is time for us to accept that our governmental system has now passed-over the threshold of functioning democracy, and we are now in an age where policy is meaningless. This game is about power and nothing else.
The Republican party has been evolving their approach for decades. The various eras of Republican control took many forms. Richard Nixon’s brand of conservatism was different from Ronald Reagan’s, which was then very different from the Newt Gingrich-lead version, which accelerated the movement towards the Tea Party, and then to “Trumpism” over the next two decades. The minority in this country is using the mechanisms available to them to remain in power regardless of the consequences for our nation as a whole while we watch it happen. We know the rules, we know what they are doing to win, yet we do nothing to change.
The last time the Democratic Party won a majority of white voters in a Presidential election was in 1964. Coincidentally, President Johnson signed the voting rights act in 1965. Oh wait, not coincidentally at all. Ever since, the Republican Party has used race (and other culture wars) to divide and win elections. President Richard Nixon fully embraced, and expanded, the Southern Strategy to not only win southern whites, but to also scare enough northern suburban whites into voting for the GOP. The GOP has used the rules of government set up by our Founding Fathers, that were intended to protect the minority view in this country (aka the ability to own humans), to instead force minority rule on to the country. The ability to mobilize this plan has been aided by social media echo chambers, foreign interference, and a national media outlet who does the bidding of the GOP at every turn.
In the past, the Republican use of race was a touch more subtle. In 1980, then-candidate Ronald Reagan staged a rally at the Neshoba County Fair in Philadelphia, Mississippi. This seems like a fairly random choice, but that is unless you are aware that Neshoba County was the site of the murders of Black activist James Cheney and white civil rights workers Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman. But don’t worry, the message was received loud and clear from those white voters pining for a return to a segregated South. The topic of the speech was “states rights’,” again subtle enough that white suburban voters can say to themselves, “I’m not racist, I just support states’ rights.”
The dog whistles continued through the years, ranging from the “Welfare Queen” and the Willy Horton ads in 1988 (yes white suburban people, you should be scared that Black people are going to get out of jail and kill you). These days, it’s more of a bullhorn than a dog whistle, including the white replacement theory which was one of the main motivators of the shooter in Buffalo, NY and a regular focus of Tucker Carlson on FOXNews. And despite numerous polls showing that the majority of Americans either support or do not have an opinion on LGBTQ+ issues, the GOP has centered its nationwide agenda on enacting anti-LGBTQ+ measures. And of course abortion has been front and center since President Reagan saw the power of evangelical voters and the ability to divide Catholic voters.
Over the years, there are two themes that run in parallel: 1) The GOP will use race and culture issues to win, and 2) Democrats will either take the bait or tell themselves we should just ignore these fights because they will go away. Easy playbook to figure out? Absolutely. Will we keep making the same mistake over and over? Damn skippy.
Rewind back to that cold day in January of 2009. Obama is now president, and with his inauguration, the Tea Party is awakened. This is arguably the point where the GOP walked away from dog whistles and excusable metaphors and visuals and just fully embraced the hate. I mean there was a Black family in the White House…the horror.
In the 2010 elections, the GOP used fear masterfully and the stage was set for President Trump just six years later. Trump took the less subtle approach to a new level, and while Hillary Clinton clearly warned everyone of what was coming down the pike, many Democrats just ignored it. They said there was nothing to worry about, and Trump would backfire (based on dozens of meetings and conference calls I have been on) so let’s take the highroad. Well that worked out super well, didn’t it? But this time we will learn, right?
Well we had better, or not only will there be a national ban on women controlling their healthcare, but gay marriage is out of the window, contraception coverage gone, and let’s not be surprised if they starting thinking about interracial marriage as a no-go again. This is the point where we decide if we are the next Russia or Hungary, or if we go back to being the world leader we arguably once were.
The first step is to admit that just about all of us on a personal level share some of the blame. From anyone who said, “Clinton is just as bad as Trump”, anyone who voted for a third-party candidate (or wrote in someone not named Clinton or Biden), anyone who did not vote in every election, anyone who did not donate time or money, anyone who just laughed off the friend who espouses support for the authoritarian system. Anyone who has repeatedly ignored or minimized the warnings coming from minority communities as overreactions, or not something that can really be true. We all didn’t do enough.
But let’s also be clear that the Democratic Party shares a lot of the blame as well. Since 2008, Democrats have had a total of one “good election,” and it is tough to give credit to anyone but former President Trump for the Democratic wins in 2018. After the 2010 shellacking, barely winning seats in the House or Senate in 2012 (even though President Obama won reelection relatively easily), losing the US Senate in 2014, Trump winning in 2016, and almost losing the House in 2020, one might think that we as a party would be looking for a new approach. But don’t worry; if there is one thing we are good at, it is not learning lessons.
We are also lazy (why try to win local elections when we can just focus on US Senate races that we have no chance of winning), would rather be right than win (can you believe how inconsistent Republicans are in their views?), and we almost always refuse to dance with the person we showed up to the ball with (why don’t Black voters just turnout?). We are predictable, and arguably worst of all, we fall for the bait that the GOP puts out every time. Every. Damn. Time.
But the past is the past and we cannot fix that right now. Our goal is to move forward together, to put an end to the GOP Authoritarianism system, and to try to position the United States as a world leader for the next century. The GOP has proved themselves unwilling to help save our country, it is up to the Democratic party to change our trajectory. In the short term, it is time to call up a coalition war room and, in the long run, it is time to strongly consider the breakup of the Democratic party.
Since we know that there will be no help from the few remaining moderate GOP members, we are on our own here. And while we have been a coalition party for decades it is time that we truly started acting like a coalition. President Biden is the sitting president and therefore should be the head of the coalition, he must understand that the system of government that he loves so deeply is gone. There is no question that Biden’s love for country and dedication to our government is unimpeachable, but we do not have a functioning government anymore.
Biden needs to understand there are no “friends” on the other side, we are not working to make better policy anymore, and the GOP no longer cares about the norms of government or what is good for the whole country, just the minority they represent. Across the aisle are people who are willing to do whatever it takes to gain power or are happy to sit quietly on the off chance they might get something out of the deal.
Assuming Biden is up for the challenge, he needs to call in a representative from each of the factions within the Democratic Party (far left/progressive wing, the more traditional Democrats, the Black Caucus, the Hispanic Caucus, Asian Pacific American Caucus, and the more conservative/moderate members). These representatives should work behind closed doors to agree on an approach and steps moving forward. No leaks, no going to the press, just come out with a game plan and every other single Democratic member of Congress needs to get in line and STFU. This is not about policy, this is not about whether $10 million should go to this or that, and it is not about trying to position for future leadership if this effort is successful. There is one goal for this group: win as many elections as possible from the US Senate to Congress, to the State Legislatures, and state officers who control decisions on elections, healthcare etc.
If this effort is successful and the American people throw out the idea of Authoritarianism as a viable path forward, it will then be time to strongly consider the break up of the Democratic Party to save it and our country. This is a risky approach, but we do not seem to be left with many options given how incapable we are to put the overall good above the individual need for power and attention.
Like the plan for the center right/Democratic coalition we discussed in 2020, under this line of thinking we would need to create a multi-party system living within a two-party system. While there are a few iterations of what could happen, the most simplistic is breaking the party into two and forming an immediate coalition like the German combination of classic center-left, green, and pro-business progressives.
Before the break-up happens, an agreement of power share and priorities would need to be decided upon, which could be relatively (emphasis on relatively) easy. Logistically this is take some work and agreements between the factions given our voting system, but this effort would be helped immensely if states move to a rank choice voting system or a “jungle primary” similar to California (with the caveat that each new part only allows for one candidate to be on the ballot).
For the center-left faction of the Democratic Party, this approach would give them the ability to move forward without having to defend the actions and statements of the more liberal members of the party (think Congressman Ryan running for Senate in Ohio). This party would likely be more regional in the Senate, but much more geographically diverse in the House. This party should NOT take the label “Democrat” allowing the more moderate members to shed a brand that is toxic in too many parts of this country and open the door of some of the remaining moderate Republicans in Washington and state capitols to grow a spine and leave the party of Trump.
For the liberal faction, an agreement would be needed to meet a few specific and bigger goals. This certainly could include items such as universal health coverage, a tightening wealth gap, and increased economic and physical security. As stated back in November of 2020, the methods used to achieve these goals might not be exactly what the left would like, but if the goals are met, it is tough to argue against. It also frees up liberal candidates to not have to spend as much time defending, or explaining, the actions of Senators Sinema or Manchin and allows the faction to hold more clout in internal negotiations.
Ultimately where this puts us is an agreement around some big, and popular, wins: defending women’s rights to health care and abortion care, universal health coverage, re-structuring our social safety net, protecting the environment, committing to an electric vehicle infrastructure, gun control, and increasing the ability for US companies to succeed by breaking up tech monopolies, simplifying the tax code, modernizing our patent system, and making the American worker more marketable both domestically and across the globe. Not exactly small wins.
These issues not only are politically expedient but put our country on a firmer footing for moving forward in the global economy. This would put Americans of all economic levels in a better place (a huge win for the left) but also would also make American companies more competitive (a huge win for the center-left), and a definitive movement to a non-combustion engine future (a win for our non-existent Green Party).
Total pipe dream? Probably. But the fact is we are on the back slide of our democracy and big gambles are needed. We are a party that is unable to win in its current form, and we are stuck with a party across the aisle that is either batshit crazy or too scared or too delusional to do anything about taking the party away from the MAGA believers and the conservative Christian confederacy on the Supreme Court.
The Founding Fathers created a system designed for longevity, but that system assumes that the two parties will both agree on the idea that the country comes first. The tools put in place were based on a world that no longer exists and the minority in our government and our nation has used the system to not just protect their power, but to force their worldview onto the majority.
The checks that were put in place: the judicial branch, impeachment, and even electors with the ability to not put an unqualified authoritarian in office have either been, at best, ignored or, at worst, attempted to be used as tools for tyranny. We need to change our trajectory, or the United States will become a second tier country (if we haven’t already).
Addressing Critical Race Theory
Discussions about the 2022 midterm elections are already the norm, and a core issue has emerged that impacts policy-makers and public-schools alike: Critical Race Theory (CRT). If you haven’t heard of it yet, you will soon. CRT is built on a simple idea: as a country that was founded while race-based slavery fueled the economy, the United States still has laws, institutions, and customs that harm Black, Indigenous, and People of Color.
In September of 2020, former President Trump signed an executive order preventing government agencies, nonprofits, and federal contractors from hosting diversity trainings that teach CRT principles. And on President Biden’s first day in office, he rescinded the order. Much of this attention came out of the much heralded 1619 Project lead by Nikole Hannah-Jones at the New York Times, and the attacks on CRT were seen as a more workable path forward for those on the right who rely on culture wars to keep their supporters engaged (we would highly recommend listening to the New York Times Daily podcast about CRT from July 2nd, 2021 where they show how the outrage over CRT is fabricated and is being used as a social wedge by the right – and the leaders of this effort are quite clear that this is the case). Short version is that this is a manufactured issued focused on a theory of thought that was a class at Harvard Law School. There are zero schools at the K-12 level that were, or are, teaching Critical Race Theory or using it as a foundation of their teachings.
Regardless of the source of the outrage, it is here and schools are having to deal with it. With that being said, there are some key questions that politicians and schools will have to deal with. These include: should public-school teachers incorporate the lasting impacts of slavery on Black people in the United States today in their curricula? Will politicians pay a price if they advocate for it during their campaigns? What is the best way to form an argument in favor of these teachings?
To answer these questions, Lincoln Park Strategies surveyed 1,000 American adults on CRT. In the survey, we broke the respondents into two groups. We asked the first group three questions about what should be taught in schools – the causes and history of slavery, its impact on Black people in the United States today, and its impact on institutions and laws today. The second group received the same questions, but also were asked the same set of questions as they relate to education around the Holocaust in Europe.
As we see in the graph above, when people are asked about teaching the impact of slavery on modern times in schools without any additional context, the average support is 52.9 on a 0-100 scale when it comes teaching “the impact of slavery on institutions and laws in the United States today” – in other words, Critical Race Theory. This is slightly higher than teaching the impact of slavery on Black people (52.6), and almost six points lower than teaching the origins and history of slavery in the United States (58.7).
Looking past the averages, 56% of Americans support the teaching of the origins of slavery (including 36% who feel so strongly), 53% support teaching the impacts of slavery (33% strongly), and 50% support teaching CRT (our short description of it) including 32% who feel so strongly.
For the second group we first asked the same questions about the Holocaust before asking about slavery in the United States. As the chart above shows, there is a higher level of support for teaching the Holocaust in our schools (more so than teaching the origins of slavery), but what is interesting is the increase in the level of support for teaching the origins and history of slavery (+2.8 higher average), the impact of slavery on Black people in the US (+3.9), and the increase in supporting the impact of slavery on institutions and laws in the United States (+4.1).
We also see the effect of adding the context of the Holocaust on the distribution of the responses.
Since this is a made-up partisan issue in the first place, it is not surprising to see that supporters of former President Donald Trump are much less likely to support teaching anything about slavery than those who supported President Joe Biden. Indeed, 71% of Biden supporters support teaching the origins of slavery when asked without the added questions on the Holocaust, compared to just 42% of Trump supporters. The difference is even more pronounced in our shorthand of CRT where 68% of Biden voters support teaching the impact of slavery on institutions and laws in the U.S. compared to 33% of Trump voters.
A few months ago, the Democratic Strategist Group released a memo suggesting that a winning strategy in 2022 would be to pivot away from Critical Race Theory debates and define them as a distraction from real issues. They suggested that this was a nothing issue and that Democratic candidates should pivot away from CRT and instead talk about historic figures. Their suggested language was:
“I don’t believe this and neither do the people who vote for me. I’ve had my staff check and there is not a single school in my district that teaches this nonsense so let’s stop talking about utterly false issues. Instead, let’s talk about the real issue. What should our children be taught about race?
Here’s my answer. I believe our children should be taught to honor three great Americans – Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King. They should be taught to honor Thomas Jefferson because he and the other founding fathers created the magnificent American creed – the ideals of freedom, democracy, equality and justice that we still support today. They should be taught to honor Abraham Lincoln because he ended the injustice of slavery and made America live up to its creed. They should be taught to honor Martin Luther King because he led the campaigns that ended segregation, legal discrimination and disenfranchisement, moving us closer to a world of true justice and equality.”
And we are shocked that Democrats are bad at winning elections?
First of all, referring to CRT as nonsense is probably not a great place to start. Second, might we suggest that if you are talking about teaching race through individuals, that two of the three people you use as the bedrock for teaching race are not (for lack of a better term) white dudes?
As our friend Jason Stanford pointed out recently in a piece called “The New Tea Party”, this issue is being used in specific areas of the country. Not cities like Austin, TX or inner (i.e. Democratic) suburbs like Arlington or Alexandria, VA but in outer/exurbs where the GOP is trying to bring back white voters. They know they have no real issues to run on, and are concerned that interest in the election will wane with Trump not on the ballot in 2022. Therefore, they are purposely ginning up anger to motivate people to vote, and vote scared. Just ask any school board member in these areas how effective this is.
Instead of walking away from the issue, and pivoting to the greatness of white dudes, Democrats cannot just ignore the issue and continue to allow Republicans to manufacture false narrative after false narrative. We do agree with the Democratic Strategist that this issue comes down to one major component: framing the debate. As the GOP ramps up efforts to legislatively ban Critical Race Theory from classrooms through state-level legislation (again they are banning something that does not exist), Democrats will have the upper hand if they can clearly define the issue, provide a simple and easy framework around it, and advocate against such laws and the overall efforts of the Republicans trying to divide our country in order to maintain the power of minority rule.
In the past couple weeks, a school district in Texas came under fire for naming the Holocaust as a “two-sided” issue. The district interpreted a new Critical Race Theory law – requiring educators to present multiple sides of race-related issues – as a requirement to present historical events, which are typically regarded as atrocious, in a positive light. Our survey suggests that this, too, would be unpopular. Over two-thirds of Americans support teaching about the impacts of the Holocaust, rather than concealing from students the genocide of Jews and other identities in Europe. But we probably didn’t really need a survey to tell us this.
Overall, those seeking to pass laws against Critical Race Theory are in the minority. Most Americans do not want to see slavery or the Holocaust brushed aside in public schools. They believe we owe it to future generations to teach them about these historical events and their continuing impacts today.
When it comes to Critical Race Theory, Democrats should 100% support any law student at Harvard taking that class, because it is just about the only place where this specific theory is taught. In the meantime, we have a choice: we can either continue down the road of deleting the history of slavery, the Holocaust, and whatever other issues Republican operatives want to use to try to win elections, or we can continue to teach and learn from history, and not ignore modern systemic racism. The choice is ours, and there are very few success stories when it comes to civilizations and political movements based on book burning and telling teachers what they can and can’t teach.
September DC Omnibus Survey
DC likely voters are overly concerned about the spread of coronavirus and how it will affect both DC’s economy and the health of its residents. Seventy percent (70%) of DC voters are very concerned about the spread of coronavirus, with 65% very concerned about the health of loved ones and 73% very concerned about the local economy.
When it comes to approval of the government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic, DC residents are more likely to give high remarks to their local key government figures than federal. Four out of five DC residents approve of the way Mayor Muriel Bowser has handled the coronavirus pandemic. The same cannot be said for President Donald Trump where four out of five of DC voters strongly disapprove and 85% total disapprove of the way he has handled coronavirus.
While the coronavirus approval rating of President Trump and Mayor Bowser stays consistent among all DC residents, it is clear that some demographics sway from the rest.
With DC residents concerned about the spread of coronavirus it is no surprise that a majority want DC schools to be at least partially online this fall. There is no clear consensus on whether schools should be full-time online or partially online, but it is apparent that DC residents do not want it fully in the classroom. While 34% of DC residents would like school to be a combination of online and in-person, a higher percentage (46%) would like school this fall to be entirely virtual.
Interestingly, not all parents have the same opinion on how their child should attend school this fall. White parents are most likely to want their child to attend school in person with around a third (34%) of White parents wanting their child to have a combination of in-person and online learning and 14% want them fully in the classroom. When looking at minority parents, the preference for in-person schooling drops considerably with only 30% of parents of color and 29% of Black parents wanting in-person learning whether full-time or combination.
On the topic of returning to previous life activities during the coronavirus pandemic, a majority of DC residents are ok with opening most businesses as long as there are restrictions. DC residents are most comfortable with offices of less than 50 workers opening up to full capacity (10%) or with some restrictions (73%) while they are less ok with offices with more than 50 people opening to full capacity (5%) or with restrictions (56%). Indoor restaurants have a similar level of comfort, with only 22% of DC residents thinking they should not open up; this differs significantly for indoor bars, which a majority do not think should open even with restrictions.
A majority of DC residents do not share the same opinion across all types of businesses when it comes to the level at which they can open. Around a quarter (23%) of DC residents believe everything should be open with restrictions and 10% believe everything but indoor bars can open with restrictions. It can also be said that only 6% of DC residents think every business should remain closed.
What Happens on November 4, 2020? Pt. II
This is the second part of a two-part series highlighting the likeliest outcomes for each major party in the 2020 election. As we discussed in our earlier piece, our two-party system is masking many conflicting views that exist within the American public. Our research shows that there are more than ten centers of gravity when it comes to the type of candidate Americans are looking for. This means most Americans are supporting a party that somewhat represents their views, but not entirely.
In Part I the results of our four most likely outcomes for the 2020 election point mostly to trouble for the GOP. Indeed, three of the four scenarios seem to point to an inability for the Republican party to hold together a reasonable coalition of voters at best, or a complete splintering at worst.
In Part 2, we will look at the scenarios for the Democratic Party.
The Future of the Democratic Party
Immediately following President Trump’s surprise victory in 2016, many in the Democratic party have been anxiously looking ahead to the 2020 elections. Hillary Clinton’s remarkable defeat was the second major victory for the right-wing populism movement that is enjoying success across the western world (Brexit being the first). Since November of 2016 there have been multiple countries dealing with this new brand of populism. In France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Austria, right-wing parties have been enjoying a new level of success putting a strain on local governments as well as a shift in the EU Parliament. As many of these far-right groups have experienced success, far-left groups are also enjoying an insurgent level of support in many countries with the more traditional center-left and center-right parties losing ground.
The United States is unique in that there are only two viable parties in our system of government. While there is a growing gap between Republicans and Democrats, the loss of support that the traditional parties have seen across the Atlantic is different due to the lack of alternate choices. As such, the political landscape in the US is unified by frustration with politics and little else.
With the Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina, and Super Tuesday in the rear-view mirror, the field has narrowed to two main candidates vying to take on President Trump in the general election. Thus far, the race has been unpredictable, volatile, and dynamic. Within the party, we have seen new formidable candidates enter the race, perceived front-runners fall in the ranks, and a certain degree of hostility within the party borne out of urgency and pressure as the stakes have been raised throughout the election process. As we did for the GOP in Part 1 of this post over the summer, we are going to look at those outcomes and what it could mean for the Democratic Party moving into 2021.
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For the purposes of this analysis we are assuming that either Biden or Sanders will be the nominee, and a different candidate will not be chosen at the convention. Given this assumption, there are four main scenarios, in our opinion, that could happen on the Democratic side in the 2020 presidential election:
Scenario #1:
A Moderate or Progressive Democrat beats Trump.
A Democrat winning in November of 2020 would likely be viewed favorably by most from the center-left to far-left end of the spectrum. There are certainly voters who would be less than excited for the Democrat’s win (for example a President Sanders would not be the ideal choice for the more moderate Democrats, nor would a President Biden for the more progressive Dems). However, data shows that defeating Trump is the main desired outcome for Democrats, regardless of where on the ideological spectrum they are. This unifying force among Democratic voters, in the wake of success, may be strong enough to subside inner party tension between moderates and liberals. Clearly there will be disagreements over policy, and some will feel that things are being pushed too far or not far enough, but the status quo for the party is likely to remain in this scenario.
A win for the Democratic nominee will likely mean that the party once again enjoyed success in the big three great lakes states (PA, MI, WI) and perhaps even won another state or two in other parts of the country (we’re looking at you Florida, North Carolina, and Arizona). Regardless of the exact electoral count a coalition would come together in this scenario to propel the nominee into the White House. It is also likely in this scenario that there was a bigger base turnout than what happened in 2016 as well as a higher level of success in the suburban areas giving both the more progressive and moderate minded party members a talking point on what was the key to success.
It is difficult to determine the likelihood of this scenario at this point in the process and tensions between some on the left and some in the more moderate camp have already begun between the #bernieorbust and #neversanders voters. For the future of the party and success in November the hope is that these divides will be mended, but we will have to wait and see.
Scenario #2:
Sanders wins the Primary nomination but loses against Trump.
The difficulties of finding a decided Democratic front-runner candidate highlight the main divide within the party: should the party move left or stay close to the center in order to win the election? Reflecting back to 2016, many on the far left find the cause of Clinton’s defeat within her lack of progressiveness seeing as much of the Democratic base did not show her support in key states. This kind of rhetoric currently fuels support for a progressive candidate to be the Democratic Nominee in the 2020 Presidential race.
If Sanders wins the nomination but loses the election, it will likely take some wind out of the sails for the left. The more moderate wing will push to be in control of the party moving forward, creating an even bigger rift between the two ends of the spectrum. If this scenario occurs, it seems unlikely that the GOP would lose control of the Senate and it also seems plausible that the House switches back to GOP control. If the GOP won control of all three branches of government, it is hard to see how the party can hold together in a meaningful way.
Based on recent results and polling data, this scenario is experiencing a lower level of likelihood as Bernie Sanders is behind in delegate votes and might not perform as well in states like Michigan and Missouri as he did four years ago (but we will have to wait and see what the outcome is). If he does enter the convention with a plurality of delegates, he has made clear that he believes he should get the nod from the party.
While defeating Trump is viewed as job number one, the more moderate side of the Democratic party still has strong reservations over a Sanders nomination. Democrats are wary of the cost of supporting a candidate so far from the party center, and this sentiment unfolded on the debate stage in South Carolina as other Democratic candidates warned voters of the risk a far-left progressive candidate poses to victory against Trump.
If Sanders were to get the nomination, we will see if he can win over the doubts of moderate Democrats. This will be difficult given his rhetoric about the “Democratic Elites” and other terms. In addition, moderate candidates running in tough districts around the country are going to have to decide on whether or not to support Sanders’ ideas or create distance. If they embrace his ideas (‘accept them’ might be a better term) they will definitely create a headwind for their re-election. If they walk away from the ideas Sanders is espousing, then the story becomes how the establishment is not supporting their party’s nomination. This situation is made even more difficult given the fact that sweeping plans like Medicare for All have just about zero chance of ever getting through Congress.
Given all these factors is it tough to see a functioning party exit the 2020 election intact.
Scenario #3:
Biden wins Primary nomination but loses against Trump.
In predicting the result of this scenario, the Democratic backlash from the 2016 Presidential Election provides an indication of the outcome. As discussed earlier, in the wake of a disappointing defeat, many liberals pointed to Hilary’s lack of progressiveness as the gateway for Trump’s victory. Amidst four years of increasing political tension fueled by an urgency to oust the current administration, it is reasonable to predict that if a moderate Democrat wins in the primary and is unable to beat Trump, it would be tough for the party to hold together. In the shadow of a second defeat and a frustrated far-left, fingers would be pointed and blame would be placed further exacerbating inner party divides.
A schism in the party seems more likely in this scenario given the anger that would likely erupt on the far left, and the likely lack of a credible argument from the moderate side for a more measured approach. The worst case for the party in this scenario is a breakup of the party, which is plausible but not very likely. Certainly, the party would move further to the left making the long-term prospects of the party as a home for moderates questionable at best.
After Super Tuesday, this scenario is experiencing an increased level of likelihood as Joe Biden is leading in delegate votes. After a rough start from the Iowa Caucus to the Nevada Primary, Biden’s decisive win in South Carolina propelled him back into the race and with enough momentum to take away the most delegates and claim victory for 10 out of 14 states on Super Tuesday. He is arguably in the best position going into the next round of primaries on March 10th, but we will have to wait and see what the outcome is.
If this scenario happens it seems virtually certain that the GOP would hold the Senate leaving the Democrats in the position of being able to do very little with an emboldened Trump and a Senate moving through legislation with 50 votes. Control of the House also be in question, but maybe less so than in Scenario 2.
Scenario #4:
A Democratic candidate wins the nomination, the losing ideological faction of the party runs as a third-party, and Trump wins.
This is the nightmare situation for Democrats. If Democrats are unable to set aside their political differences and work together to beat Trump, their disunity would guarantee Trump wins re-election. The blame for the inability to win would move from more theoretical (as in Scenario 2 and 3) to crystal clear. The ability for the two sides to come together in this situation is even harder to imagine.
This would not just divide voters, but also the financial backing from Democrat donors, the messaging, and the general infrastructure of the party. Post-election the focus would likely be on infighting as opposed to a unified front in a way that makes survival of the party hard to imagine. The possible interesting outcome of this scenario would be if the center-left and center-right come together creating a new party with the far left and far right out on their own.
Given the fact that this scenario spells a clear victory for the GOP and that Democrats are unified by ousting Trump from office, this scenario seems unthinkable. But, we will have to see how the rest of the primary election plays out.
Conclusions:
The Democratic Party’s future is up in the air, and most of these scenarios suggests troubled waters are ahead. First and foremost, the current threat to a Democratic victory are the divides that exist within the party itself. Until there is a Democratic front-runner, it will be hard to envision a future where the Democratic Party can successfully take down the GOP.
Although there are many ways 2020 could turn out, what is apparent is that there will be ramifications for the long-term direction of both parties. Whether parties struggle to unite, move toward the center, or further into their respective corners, 2020 will be among the most consequential elections in our nation's history.
Regardless of the outcome, one thing is clear – at the root of the struggle is the structure of a two party system based on two choices, and the frustration of an electorate that needs more. Regardless all the research, data, and polling, only time will tell which outcome will come to fruition.
Shifts in Democratic Presidential Support
We see polling results in the news and might have a good sense of who is currently up or down, but keeping track of changes over time can be a challenge. To make things easier, we put together a chart to help visualize these shifts in support for the major Democratic candidates up through June of this year. These numbers are based on the Real Clear Politics average.
National Survey on Trump's Tweets
What Happens On November 4, 2020? Pt. I
With the 2020 election quickly approaching and more than 20 Democratic candidates looking to take on President Donald Trump next November, voters across the country are already being asked by pollsters and strategists to provide their election opinions. To keep things a little different, we thought it would be interesting to jump forward to November 4, 2020 to get a glimpse of potential outcomes and results once the votes across the country have all been tallied.
As we have pointed out in the past, our two-party system unfortunately oversimplifies meaningful complexities existing within our Republic. In our current political dynamic, perspectives and views of the American people are essentially reduced to Republican or Democratic. This system lacks true diversity of ideals and values, and leaves most Americans disappointed with the divisions it creates. According to our research, it would take 11 political parties to truly demonstrate the myriad of political ideologies that are held by the American people.
Over the course of America’s development, political parties have come and gone, however, it is still quite rare to see an election where three or more parties are able to co-exist and have a chance at success.
As we found in our past research, there are a few centers of ideology that emerge across the political spectrum. About a quarter of Americans are firmly on the liberal end of the ideological spectrum and about 1 in 5 are solidly on the conservative end. This leaves a little over half of would be voters living somewhere in between the two ends of the political spectrum. The last two elections have both increased and magnified the divide growing over the past decade, and unfortunately, there’s little evidence pointing to this dynamic changing over the next few years.
This dynamic has shifted the makeup of the base voters for each party. In general, the Democratic Party’s base largely consists of racial minorities joined by white, college educated urban and suburban voters. On the other side of the aisle, the Republican Party, while trying to retain its traditional pro-business, small government cohorts, has, in general, become the home of white, non-college working class voters.
Given the fact that we have always reduced the American public into two distinct brackets, it is no wonder that dissatisfaction with both parties is consistently at a high level and makes our two existing coalitions feel precarious, even in the best of times. With this in mind, we started thinking about what the outcome of the 2020 election could mean for the two parties moving forward. With well over a year before any votes are cast in the general election, this of course is not a prediction, but instead is a look into plausible outcomes. We broke this piece down into two parts, where week 1 is our probe into the Republican Party, and Week 2 focuses on the Democratic Party.
Part I: The Future of the Republican Party
The Republican party is hardly one party at all – but rather a coalition of different voting blocs whose most important policy solutions are championed by various members of the party. One of the bigger voting blocks consists of President Trump’s most ardent supporters. Those voters who believe that our country needs to “Make America Great Again”. The narrative around this cohort is that these voters have experienced a decrease in financial viability, and rather successfully, the Republican Party has capitalized on these economic anxieties. Whether by pushing the narrative that fewer government regulations and tax cuts will help reopen mines and factories, or that undocumented immigrants are to blame for their issues – many white, rural working-class voters have been able to find a home in Trump’s Republican party.
Along with this base group, the current GOP coalition brings together a group that seems to care less about fiscal policy but sees Republican leaders as preservers of their religiously based social and moral values. Additionally, there are those who have a particular amendment in the Constitution that is their main motivation for voting. Voters in this cohort generally feel the Republican party shares their constitutionalists interpretations of our founding documents and find solace in the party’s passionate defense of the second amendment, hardline immigration policies, definition of marriage, and its anti-abortion stances.
The final group are the more “traditional” GOP voters who describe themselves as pro-business while being generally indifferent on social issues. These voters have become increasingly uncomfortable with further shift to the right on social issues, as well as the President’s approach to economic issues, making more and more members finding the party less palatable.
This is a bit of an oversimplification of the different cohorts in the party, and there is a good amount of overlap in many of the groups described above, however, if we accept these characterizations, then presumably, the GOP has enjoyed their success by joining just enough voters from of each of these cohorts to ensure a majority of support-- or in the case of the President, enough voters in key states to win the Electoral College. This coalition, so to speak, can work in some parts of the country but, as we saw in the 2018 election results, remains prone to fractures which can complicate election outcomes for the Republican Party (see Orange County, California).
While some GOP voters clearly have had enough with the party and voted for Democratic candidates in 2018 (or at a minimum staying home on Election Day) for now, Republicans are still enjoying success in many parts of the country by utilizing mindful strategies that continue to appeal to their base voters. For example, when analyzing data on immigration policy and border wall legislation, we see a high level of approval ratings by Republican base voters, but those considered socially moderate appear to be a bit uneasy at best. According to our analysis, this group of detractors, or those uncomfortable with the policies, makes up about a quarter of GOP voters (24%). This is seemingly low to some, however, if a quarter of the coalition is unhappy and decided to vote in opposition to the GOP, the path to reelection becomes very tricky for the President and GOP Senators in many states.
Trump’s recent trade war with China (and threats to Mexico, Iran, and recently France) may be leading to a decisive fracture of Trump’s remaining supporters. The effects of the trade dispute have been felt most by those who work in the steel and agriculture industries. The industries that rely on the exportation of products across the globe and those that rely on cheaper material imports to keep prices down for consumers. Our data indicates that a majority of voters don’t believe the trade war is good for the US. Indeed, 75% of American voters believe the US is being hurt by the trade war, making this among the most significant rebukes of Trump by Republicans since the President’s time in office (at least when answering surveys).
With all that being said, there is a lot going on within the party and with no credible opposition to the President in the primary, it will be up to the President to bring a successful coalition together. With this in mind, we feel there are four scenarios that could unfold for the Republicans in 2020:
Scenario #1:
Trump wins in spite of losing support from moderate Republicans.
In scenario one, if Trump targets only his core base, it would present challenges for his reelection. First, key swing states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) were already narrowly won in 2016. Losing these states in the 2020 election would make a win virtually impossible for the President. First, the math points to the fact that in order to win the President will need to appeal not just to the rural and working-class voters he is expected to win, but also to voters in the more affluent suburbs of Philadelphia, Detroit, and Milwaukee. Second, without moderates, Trump may not be able to count on enough support from key Southern states. In 2018 states such as North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Arizona, and Texas saw competitive races where historical Republican advantages are considered to be the norm. If Trump loses Florida (let alone Texas) an Electoral College win seems very unlikely. Without Trump appealing to a broader constituency, a Democrat could easily tap into the increasingly progressive and ethnically diverse voter base in these states which could spell trouble for the president’s re-election.
In 2016, among the 20 states which Trump lost, his approval rating was at or below 40%. Today, with Trump’s national approval rating hovering in the low 40’s, without appealing to a broader (more moderate) base, his reelection would be an uphill battle. Though Trump’s approval ratings in the key midwestern states of Michigan (43%), Wisconsin (42%), and Pennsylvania (45%) are somewhat low, they are above the 40% threshold that was the key in 2016, he does not have a lot of room to spare. It should also be noted that being above 40% approval did not guarantee success, however the fact remains that the math without a decent share of moderate Republicans supporting his re-election will make it tough on the President.
As improbable as it seems, we are not going to completely rule out this scenario. If he does win with basically just his base, the far right would be even more emboldened, and the GOP would officially become the party of Trump. Additionally, if this scenario happens it also appears unlikely that the GOP would lose control of the Senate. The few remaining moderate Republicans would be completely sidelined and success in many areas of the country would become nearly impossible for the Republican Party. This all feels like a low probability outcome, but not impossible.
Scenario #2:
Trump retains enough support from moderates Republicans and Independents to win.
In scenario two, moderate Republicans and Independents will have chosen to overlook their disagreements with Trump and vote for his reelection. This would basically be a replay of the 2016 election and Trump would hold the three key mid-western states (or at least Pennsylvania and one other) and have four more years on Pennsylvania Avenue.
In this scenario the current trajectory of the party would continue to exist. Moderate elected officials in DC will have very little power to effect change, even though voters that share their views will have provided Trump with his victory. A Trump re-election would be Trump-ism’s litmus test and would essentially put the final nail in the coffin of the Republican Party as the Party of Lincoln and establish it as the Party of Trump. In his first three years as president, Trump has already made two Supreme Court appointments and deregulated industry and environmental protections. Trump’s election to a second term would represent a turning point in national politics. Not only could a second term allow for more lifetime judicial appointments handpicked by the President –but his executive orders and reshaping of government will have impacts that reach far into the future exceeding well beyond his presidency.
Given what we have seen in his first three years in office, Trump's reelection would represent not just a transformation of the Republican Party but would make those same transformations incredibly hard to reverse. If this scenario plays out, it is not unreasonable to think that the “establishment” wing of the party will be completely sidelined and unlikely to yield any real power. Many members of the moderate wing of the party are likely to have lost in the primaries against candidates that are more in line with Trump, and those left are likely to be too scared of a primary loss to challenge the President.
Clearly this scenario cannot be ruled out given the President’s victory in 2016. At this point in time, the percent chance of Trump winning the popular vote feels incredibly low, but if he can pull together enough support in a few key states, it is not unreasonable to think a replay of the last election could take place. If this happens it is hard to picture how the GOP is anything but the party of Trump.
Scenario #3:
Trump loses, Republicans across the spectrum quickly back establishment candidates.
Within this scenario, while the Republicans would lose the White House, it would provide an opportunity for the Establishment wing to reclaim the party. It might be challenging to reunite the party back under traditional conservative ideals, but if Trump’s supporters show they are ready to move on, his leadership of the party would end quickly. Given the fact that he is in power, it is hard to picture exactly how this scenario would play out especially given the fact that survey after survey shows a loyal set of supporters for the President and it doesn’t seem plausible that they would quickly abandon their current leader. Additionally, many media figures on the right are all in on trying to jettison members of the caucus that are viewed as not conservative enough.
For those hoping that this is the outcome for the GOP, one of the challenges ahead is the fact that the Republican Party has for all intents and purposes purged itself of nearly all of its moderate candidates and instead has increased its concentration of its hardcore base. Former Republican senator Jeff Flake even described his party as “race to the bottom to see who can be meaner, madder and crazier. It is not enough to be conservative anymore. You have to be vicious.”
Without Trump at the top of the ticket, if he followed President George W Bush’s lead and left the office and remained out of the public eye, it is possible that there could be a return of more moderate and measured Republican candidates. There are moderate Republican leaders like Governors Charlie Baker in Massachusetts and Larry Hogan in Maryland who seem to be setting themselves up to be the flag bearer of the “new” GOP after a Trump defeat, and while these two governors are incredibly popular in Blue States, it would take the base to come around and support the new leadership to make this scenario possible.
Ultimately the question becomes, would the hatred of the hard-core conservative base for whoever ends up in the White House be greater than their desire for a continuation of Trump’s policies and approach? If opposing the new President is enough then this scenario could certainly be the outcome after 2020.
Scenario #4:
Trump loses yet keeps supporters.
Of the two scenarios where Trump loses in 2020, this scenario seems most probable to us. In this version of the future, the President loses at least two of the three Great Lakes states (PA, MI, and WI) and as a result, fails to win reelection. After the election, the moderate or “Establishment” wing attempts to regain control of the party and Trump’s support base revolts.
If this scenario were to happen, it would spell trouble for the establishment. With Donald Trump’s incredible influence over rural America and the rust belt, his iconic methodical connection to the plights of this voting bloc is enough to spur fractures that could lead to the development of a new party focusing only on the far-right end of the spectrum.
The math on the national level, and in many states, would become nearly impossible, but this would keep Trump with a group of followers, keep him in the news, and create a longer lasting legacy for Trump but would spell the end of the GOP as we know it. Ultimately it would mean that Trump would be putting himself above what is good for the party, which does not seem like a stretch given the behavior we have seen from him over the past four years.
Those trying to take control of the party, such as Baker and Hogan, would have to offset a rebuke of the President and potential angering of a substantial voting bloc by trying to win back suburban, white, educated voters lost throughout the Trump presidency. This would be a tricky balancing act to say the least. However, it is possible the Democrats could nominate someone so hated by both factions that they come back together quickly, but this would basically need the blessing of the current President to happen effectively and a power share between Trump and a moderate wing seems unworkable.
Conclusions
In pursuit of maintaining the status quo, Republican voters have demonstrated a proven ability to continue to support their party, despite strong policy disagreements and character complaints about the President. In the general election, Republican voters will again have to choose to deny or give a stamp of approval to having Trump at the heart of their party.
In three of our four plausible scenarios, the GOP will either fully become the party of Trump, or the party is unlikely to hold together in a meaningful way. In one of the four scenarios the “establishment” wing of the party could take back control. This outcome is fully dependent on Trump’s base supporters and likely will have a lot to do with who the Democratic nominee ends up being and ends up winning.
Based on our thinking, the outcome for the Republican party, appears rocky at best, but before this potential demise leads to left-leaning celebration, it should be noted that, the path ahead is not exactly smooth for Democrats either (more on that in the next installment). Democrats will soon have to decide whether a more progressive candidate is going to be their standard bearer, or a more moderate candidate. For both parties, a more vocal, and powerful base, is making it increasingly difficult to appeal to a broad political base. There will likely come a breaking point when various factions within the parties will no longer go along with ideas that reflects the diversity in America and instead focus solely on policies that are more to the far left and far right view of the world.
It is true that voters in Red States have proved that they’re not against progressive economic policies – several states raised the minimum wage or expanded Medicaid through referendums – but this is a far cry from a wholesale shift in party allegiance. All of this raises a question: is this the end of the Republican Party or the beginning of a new one?